‘God Hath Given the World to Men in Common’ This article examines what limitations to private property John Locke recognizes to protect the rights of the poor. As has been pointed out in the literature, Locke’s ideas on the limitations to private property have been influenced by medieval discussions about the rights of the poor and the principle of extreme necessity. Confirming this interpretation, the article shows that Locke borrows the distinction between ‘ordinary need’ and ‘evident and urgent necessity’ from (...) Thomas Aquinas. Taking position in a debate among Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke argues that the poor have a natural right to the ‘surplus’ of somebody else’s possessions, and that this right becomes legally enforceable in case of ‘evident and urgent necessity.’. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau devoted an important chapter of his Social Contract to the dictatorship. Carl Schmitt interpreted Rousseau’s chapter as marking the transition from ‘commissarial’ to ‘sovereign dictatorship’. This article argues that Schmitt’s interpretation is historically and conceptually inaccurate. Instead of paving the way for sovereign dictatorship, Rousseau carefully distinguished the dictatorship from the people’s sovereign authority. Taking position in the ‘debate’ between Bodin and Grotius on the relation between dictatorship and sovereignty, he argued that the dictator could provisionally suspend the (...) people’s sovereign authority, but not abolish it. More particularly, the dictator did not possess the power to make generally binding laws, which had to remain the exclusive authority of the popular assembly. However, this did not prevent Rousseau from recognizing the dictatorship as a means for democratic reform. Rousseau thus conceived of the dictatorship as a time-limited and revocable commission to protect the constitution and to provide for a more stable and effective state organization based on the principle of popular sovereignty. (shrink)

On 9 December 1930, Walter Benjamin sent a copy of his book The Origin of German Tragic Drama to Carl Schmitt, accompanied by a letter in which he expressed his indebtedness to Schmitt: "You will very quickly recognize how much my book is indebted to you for its presentation of the doctrine of sovereignty in the seventeenth century. Perhaps I may say, in addition, that I have also derived from your later works, especially Die Diktatur, a confirmation of my modes (...) of research in the philosophy of art from yours in the philosophy of the state. If the reading of my book allows this feeling to emerge in an intelligible fashion, then the purpose of my sending it to you will be achieved" (qtd. in Weber 1992, 5). As .. (shrink)

Enemy of All Humanity: The Dehumanizing Effects of a Dangerous Concept In his contribution to this special issue, David Luban proposes to revive the age-old concept of ‘the enemy of all humanity.’ On his view, this concept supports the aims of international criminal justice by emphasizing that atrocity and persecution crimes are ‘radically evil’ and therefore ‘everyone’s business.’ Criticizing Luban’s proposal, this paper shows that in the past, the ‘enemy of all humanity’ concept has often served to establish parallel systems (...) of justice, depriving these ‘enemies’ of their rights as suspects under criminal law and as lawful combatants under the laws of war. Thus, even if the ‘enemy of all humanity’ concept is used with the intention to bring today’s perpetrators of ‘radical evil’ to justice, it risks undermining, rather than protecting, the rule of law. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article seeks to explain why the Roman dictatorship, which had served as a positive model of constitutional emergency government until the French Revolution, acquired a negative meaning during the Revolution itself. Both Montesquieu and Rousseau regarded the dictatorship as a legitimate institution, necessary to protect the republic in times of crisis. For the French revolutionaries, the word ‘dictatorship’ acquired negative connotations: it became a rhetorical tool for accusing their political opponents of authoritarian rule. This article argues that Carl (...) Schmitt’s distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship is unhelpful for understanding why the dictatorship was rejected by the French revolutionaries. Instead, it shows that it was the early identification with Montesquieu’s aristocratic dictatorship, which caused the delegates of the National Assembly to reject it as a threat to popular sovereignty. The exception was Marat, who proposed to establish a popular dictatorship à la Rousseau to purge the state from counterrevolutionary forces. However, Marat’s proposal found little support with his fellow-Jacobins, as it allowed the Girondins to accuse them of a conspiracy against the Convention. This caused the Jacobins to reject the dictatorship altogether and to propose alternative models of emergency government. (shrink)

The spreading phenomenon of Euroscepticism is manifested in critical practices in discourse that oppose European integration. This paper explores Euroscepticism as an element of discourse, which cannot only be measured as party positions or individual attitudes. Based on this understanding, our argument is twofold. Firstly, Euroscepticism relates to the unsettled and principally contested character of the European Union (EU) as a political entity: its basic purpose and rationale, its institutional design and its future trajectory. It correlates with pro-European discourse and (...) the attempts to promote the (democratic) legitimacy of the EU. Secondly, we argue that Euroscepticism unfolds primarily through mass media. As such, it is given public expression through general news values, drama and narratives that are targeted to draw the attention of the wider audience. Understanding this responsive and public nature of Euroscepticism leads us, in the end, to a comprehensive typology of six forms of polity evaluation of the EU. (shrink)

This introduction presents an analysis of Grotius’s treatise ‘On Public Partnership with Unbelievers’ (De societate publica cum infidelibus). It was probably written between 1606 and 1609, when Grotius served as a legal advisor of the Dutch East India Company (voc). In his treatise, Grotius explains what kinds of partnerships with non-Christians are permissible under divine and natural law. These include public partnerships, such as treaties and military alliances, but also private associations, such as commercial contracts, marriages and relations of servitude. (...) As we argue in this introduction, De societate can be interpreted as a general treatise on legal partnerships with non-Christians, which relates both to the voc’s policies of treaty and alliance-making in the East Indies and to debates about the legal status of religious minorities in the Dutch Republic. (shrink)

As part of current energy transitions in the Global North, households have begun adopting renewable energy technologies, such as heat pumps and solar power systems, in significant numbers. These changes give rise to the following question: how are technology and gender configured when new technologies enter everyday life? Based upon ethnographic fieldwork on interactions between households, technologies, and technicians and interviews with sales technicians, installers, and service mechanics, I demonstrate how both stable and fragile variants of renewable energy technologies are (...) enacted during prepurchase consultations and postpurchase installations, respectively. I employ science and technology studies scholarship, feminist ethics, and repair and maintenance studies—captured through the analytical lens of care—to analyze how technicians mobilize and tinker with gendered affection, knowledge, and action in households to effectuate adoption of renewable energy technologies. I clarify how, in this process, openings are created to configure both hegemonic and heterogeneous gender–technology relations. Finally, I advance discussion beyond gender issues by arguing that acknowledging the role of maintainability and the repair of user–technology relations in current energy transitions opens pathways not only for exploring gender in new and exciting ways in relation to technology but technician–user relationships as well. (shrink)

The aim of the present research was twofold. First, we examined the effects of perceived organizational support on workplace conflict (i.e., relationship conflict and task conflict). Second, we identified one mechanism explaining these relationships, namely failure-related trust. Using a sample of 263 teachers from Belgium, the results of Study 1 indicated that perceived organizational support is negatively related to relationship conflict and is also, unexpectedly, negatively related to task conflict. Furthermore, using a sample of 477 Belgian employees, Study 2 replicated (...) these results and further demonstrated that failure-related trust mediates the negative relationship between perceived organizational support and both types of workplace conflict. Theoretical and practical insights of this research are discussed. (shrink)

The Human Agenda is the first Special Edition of The Cambridge Journal of Law, Politics, and Art (CJLPA), an interdisciplinary journal founded at the University of Cambridge. Focused on the unique intersections of law, politics and art in the context of human rights, contributors to the Special Edition include David Baragwanath, Luis Moreno Ocampo, Nadia Murad, Nancy Hollander, Andrew Clapham, Vladimir Osechkin, Mansour al-Omari, and many others. A full table of contents is available through the publication's own page.

It seems to be self-evident that through perception we gain access to the material world. That visual perception takes an important role seems self-evident as well. But what exactly do we see? The objects themselves or just their perceptible properties? How do we manage to see something at all? Are we capable of seeing solely through optical and physiological processes or does viewing something asks for presupposed terms in order to help us to see something as something? These questions, currently (...) discussed at great length within the framework of cognitive and epistemological theory, were already cause for intensive debate in the early modern times. In many aspects, those discussions in the 17th and 18th century laid the groundwork for today’s theories: on one hand, they identified the problems with great clarity and on the other, they provided strategies for possible solutions which are still of value today. This volume will provide new access to those debates (from Descartes to Reid) and will present these debates to an audience interested in philosophical questions. The book shows that the early modern times is not just a respectable museum in the history of philosophy, but on the contrary, a very productive and stimulating philosophical epoch which invites further discussion. (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of hospitality and faith in Derrida and Kierkegaard. The aim is to trace the topological core of existence in relation to an ongoing debate in contemporary continental philosophy of religion about khôra. The paper shows how khôral traces are at work in Kierkegaard’s thinking in relation to the topological proximity of love. The claim is, that Kierkegaard emphasizes, not a hostility but a vulnerability of what I coin khôral love – the vibrating space between the (...) anonymous and the amorous, call and response. The unknown X of the khôral becomes the topos of existence – the “stepping out”, the “you are here (X)”. A “you” called forth by the commandment of love or the visitation of the stranger. (shrink)

How do the pictures Wittgenstein and his relatives took during his life relate to his philosophical work? The exhibition at the Leopold Museum in Vienna in 2021 demonstrated a complex network of resemblances, overlaps, and cross-references between Wittgenstein’s way of working and the pictures he collected. In this essay, the network is used as an example to argue that a combination of philosophy and artistic sensibility might be a fruitful enrichment for a philosophical practise.

In his classic Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, Erich Auerbach famously cites the opening pages of Honoré de Balzac’s Père Goriot as emblematic of modern realism. With their minute description of the boardinghouse, where much of the novel’s action takes place, these pages emphasize physical setting, Auerbach argues, in a way new to Western literature. Yet Balzac’s descriptions are driven by something more than an ambition to represent “contemporary life” in scrupulous detail. In Auerbach’s view, the characteristic (...) element of Balzac’s realism is an obsession with the reciprocal action of characters and milieu, a scientific or philosophical principle according to which the quality... (shrink)

Plato’s dialogues, most notably the Phaedrus and the Symposium, mark the beginning of 2,400 years of written philosophical contemplations on love. Many lovers have loved since, and many thinkers have thought and struggled to understand. Who has never asked themselves the question: What is love? The various discussions since range from Aristotle to an abundance of contemporary philosophy and fiction on the topic. Alain Badiou’s In Praise of Love, Alain de Botton’s Essays in Love, and Byung Chul Han’s Die Agonie (...) des Eros, all published in the past ten years, refer to Plato’s account, so it is clear that Plato’s treatment of love remains relevant. Naturally, the conception has also dramatically changed over this long period of time. The non-sexual, purely intellectual relationship that the modern English speaker understands as ‘Platonic love’ is rather distinct from the account we get in Plato’s own works, which are predominantly focused on a striving for perfection through beauty. Modern everyday understandings of personal love, ranging from motherly to romantic love, are something else altogether. (shrink)

Hume seems to have discarded with final causes and teleology. However, his invocation of a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas suggests otherwise. This paper takes Hume’s general strategy of shifting to the external perspective into account, and argues that the seemingly internal property of force and vivacity are, in fact, functional-teleological properties. Force and vivacity bears many explanatory burdens: It explains the difference between imagination and memory, between conception and belief, and it (...) establishes causal necessity. What kind of property is this supposed to be? We can answer this question by taking into account Hume’s explanation of the way in which this very property is communicated in the cases of ideas of memory and belief, and of the function it performs in these cases. It will be argued that force and vivacity is not an intrinsic, phenomenal property of ideas. It is a relational and historical property. A major objective of the paper is the application of this interpretation from the case of ideas to the case of impression. What kind of history could transfer force and vivacity to impressions? Answer: natural history. By a careful examination of passages concerning innate capacities, passions, and animal instincts, we can make sense of the tenet that impressions have force and vivacity because of our natural history. It will be suggested that Hume’s philosophy of mind is fit to integrate Darwinian Design as an explanatory corner-stone. Hume, so scheint, ist ein scharfer Kritiker von Finalursachen und Teleologie. Seine häufig als ironisch missverstandene Berufung auf eine Art „prästabilierter Harmonie“ zwischen Naturverläufen und Ideenabfolgen verweist jedoch auf eine andere Lesart. Der folgende Essay behauptet, indem er Humes explanatorische Strategie betont, etwa im Falle seiner berühmten Lösung der skeptischen Zweifele zur Kausalität zu einer externen Perspektive zu wechseln, dass es sich bei der scheinbar geistinternen Eigenschaft „Kraft und Lebendigkeit“ tatsächlich um eine teleologisch- historische Eigenschaft handelt. Kraft und Lebendigkeit leisten in Humes Philosophie des Geistes eine große Erklärungsarbeit: Sie erklären den Unterscheid zwischen Vorstellung und Erinnerung, zwischen Vorstellung und Überzeugung, und sie stellen die wesentliche Zutat der kausalen Notwendigkeit dar. Doch um welche Art Eigenschaft handelt es sich? Diese Frage kannmit Blick auf Humes Ausführung darüber beantwortet werden, wie diese Eigenschaft auf Ideen der Erinnerung und auf Überzeugungsideen übertragen wird, und v.a. mit Blick auf die Funktion, die diese Eigenschaft übernimmt. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass es sich bei Kraft und Lebendigkeit um keine intrinsische, phänomenale Eigenschaft von Ideen handelt, sondern um eine relationale, historische Eigenschaft. Ein wichtiges Ziel des Essays besteht darin, diese Deutung von Ideen auf Eindrücke zu übertragen. Inwiefern kann es sich bei der Kraft und Lebendigkeit von Eindrücken umeine relationale und historische Eigenschaft handeln? Die Antwort findet sich in der Naturgeschichte, wie mit Verweis auf Humes Ausführungen zu angeborenen Fähigkeiten, Leidenschaften und tierlichen Instinkten gezeigt werden kann. Die Stoßrichtung des Essays besagt, dass Humes Philosophie des Geistes durchaus mit einer Darwinschen Auffassung des Geistes zusammengeführt werden kann. (shrink)

In this paper I shall be concerned with the new concept of existence that is emerging from recent phenomenology and existential philosophy. I shall begin by raising certain logical questions about this concept of existence. What kind of a concept is it? Does it possess any peculiar features which distinguish it from other concepts in normal use? It refers to something, our own existence, which we experience immediately or directly. Hence, in the second place, I shall examine the relation of (...) this concept to experience, and the method by which it may be clarified and refined. (shrink)

According to Marin Cureau de La Chambre—steering a middleway between the Aristotelian and the Cartesian conception of the soul—everything that lives cognizes and everything that cognizes is alive. Cureau sticks with the general tripart distinction of vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual soul. Each part of the soul has its own cognition. Cognition is the way in which living beings regulate bodily equilibirum and environmental navigation. This regulative activity is gouverned by acquired or by innate images. Natural cognition (or instinct) is cognition (...) by innate images only. Cureau develops a highly originel theory of natural (or 'specialized') instinct. His theory attempts to explain five features of instinct (innateness, specialization, species-specifitiy, coerciveness, teleological nature). According to my interpretation, Cureau proposes a species of what is called a 'teleosemantic theory' of innate cognition. (shrink)

It seems to be self-evident that through perception we gain access to the material world. That visual perception takes an important role seems self-evident as well. But what exactly do we see? The objects themselves or just their perceptible properties? How do we manage to see something at all? Are we capable of seeing solely through optical and physiological processes or does viewing something asks for presupposed terms in order to help us to see something as something? These questions, currently (...) discussed at great length within the framework of cognitive and epistemological theory, were already cause for intensive debate in the early modern times. In many aspects, those discussions in the 17th and 18th century laid the groundwork for today’s theories: on one hand, they identified the problems with great clarity and on the other, they provided strategies for possible solutions which are still of value today. This volume will provide new access to those debates (from Descartes to Reid) and will present these debates to an audience interested in philosophical questions. The book shows that the early modern times is not just a respectable museum in the history of philosophy, but on the contrary, a very productive and stimulating philosophical epoch which invites further discussion. (shrink)

Against Kant, Eckart Förster claims that Goethe’s methodology of intuitive understanding is a real possibility for us. Firstly, this essay shows that this methodology has to be strictly distinguished from the questionable use of intuitions in contemporary analytic philosophy; secondly, strong parallels between Goethe’s intuitive understanding and Bergson’s intuition are put forward. Both use intuitions as a tool to find essence concepts for natural kinds. Moreover, the parallels help naturalists to detach Förster’s important insight from the idealistic context.

SummaryThe prevalent view that a question expressed by the interrogative title must be absurd and in no need of a reasoned response is rejected. Popper's contention that commitment to rationality has only an irrational basis is criticised. A preliminary attempt is made to resolve some genuine perplexities about the justification of rationality by invoking the notion of a “quasi‐rationality” shared by human beings and other animals. Ah appendix on the metaphor of support is attached.RésuméĽauteur rejette ľopinion prédominate selon laquelle la (...) question contenue dans ce titre doit être absurde et ne mérite de ce fait aucune réponse raisonnée . Il critique ľaffimation de Popper que ľengagement en faveur de la rationalité ait une base uniquement irrationnelle. Il tente un premier essai pour résoudre quelques perplexités quant à la justification de la rationalité en introduisant la notion de quasi‐rationalité que partagent les êtres humains et autres animaux. Suit un appendice sur la métaphore anglaise support.ZusammenfassungDer Verfasser verwirft die überwiegende Auffassung, dass die im Titel aufgeworfene Frage absurd sein müsse und keiner rationalen Antwort zugänglich sei . Er kritisiert auch Poppers Behauptung, dass Rationalität nur irrational begründbar sei. Es wird versucht, einige echte Verlegenheitsmomente bei der Rechtfertigung von Rationalität zu überwinden, indem der von Menschen und Tieren geteilte Begriff einer Quasirationalität eingeführt wird. In einem Appendix wird die Metapher der Stützung erörtert. (shrink)

In this book, authors from a variety of disciplines examine how the interpretative disciplines deal with the lack or loss of certainty for their signs and texts.

ZusammenfassungSeit einigen Jahren erscheinen in deutschsprachigen Medien Beiträge, die einen neuen Trend in der Versorgung von langzeitpflegebedürftigen Menschen beschreiben: die Migration in ausländische Pflegeheime, insbesondere nach Thailand oder Ost-Europa. Diese Art der Migration wird kontrovers aufgenommen. Einige Medienbeiträge beschreiben diese Praxis u. a. als „Greisen-Export“, „gerontologischen Kolonialismus“ oder „inhumane Deportation“. Die Begriffe weisen darauf hin, dass diese Migration aus sogenannten High Income Countries in Low and Middle Income Countries aus ethischer Sicht problematisch sein könnte. Allerdings gibt es bislang keine wahrnehmbare (...) wissenschaftliche ethische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen. In diesem Beitrag diagnostizieren wir, dass es sich bei der Migration Langzeit-Pflegebedürftiger tatsächlich um ein ethisch relevantes Problem handelt, und wir ordnen die von uns identifizierten ethisch relevanten Bereiche unterschiedlichen Ebenen zu: einer individual-, einer gesellschafts-, und einer global-ethischen Ebene. Auf der individualethischen Ebene diskutieren wir Fragen der Autonomie, der Verwandtschaftsbeziehungen, der Rolle von Kultur und Traditionen und der „guten Pflege“. Auf der gesellschaftsethischen Ebene diskutieren wir strukturelle Herausforderungen der Langzeitpflege und Fragen der sozialen Gerechtigkeit. Auf der globalethischen Ebene verbinden wir unser Thema mit der ethischen Diskussion des Medizintourismus und des Brain Drains und mit Fragen globaler Gerechtigkeit. Um eine weiterführende normative Analyse vornehmen zu können, sind weitere empirische Daten zu dem Phänomen notwendig. (shrink)

Definition of the problemThe upcoming reforms according to the specifications of the Master Plan 2020 provide for a competency-oriented restructuring of medical studies. This article aims to develop perspectives on how teaching ethics in medical studies can be more strongly oriented at building competencies. In this way, it pursues the goal of making the concept of competency more tangible for medical ethics and usable for the design of medical ethics education.ArgumentsWe understand competencies as dispositions for actions that enable problem solving. (...) By transferring the concept of moral intelligence to the moral actions of physicians in patient care, we specify five ethical–moral competencies that must be present for morally appropriate, ethically reflected actions by future physicians: (1) the ability to form a professional moral compass, (2) the willingness to align oneself with professional ethical norms and values, (3) the ability to perceive moral dimensions of medical action, (4) the ability to make moral judgments based on ethical considerations about the right action, and (5) the willingness to realize ethically justified action. We illustrate their importance for teaching medical ethics using the example of teaching clinical ethics in medical studies.ConclusionOur conceptualization of moral–ethical competencies can be used to design concrete courses in a competency-oriented way. Our approach could be applied analogously to other areas of teaching ethics in health care. (shrink)

This article seeks to explain how it was possible that, until the first century BC, the Roman dictatorship was never abused and turned against the constitution itself. The traditional explanation is that, contrary to its first century imitations, the dictatorship was subject to formal restrictions, such as the six months' tenure, which were strictly applied. By contrast, this article suggests that informal constraints on the dictator's powers, such as moral and religious norms, were as important as formal constraints. It shows, (...) more particularly, how the fides, or the requirement of trust, was essential for preventing an abuse of dictatorial powers. (shrink)

NED HETTINGER | : This essay explores the tension between concern for the suffering of wild animals and concern about massive human influence on nature. It examines Clare Palmer’s animal ethics and its attempt to balance a commitment to the laissez-faire policy of nonintervention in nature with our obligations to animals. The paper contrasts her approach with an alternative defence of this laissez-faire intuition based on a significant and increasingly important environmental value: Respect for an Independent Nature. The paper articulates (...) and defends naturalness value and explores its implications for the laissez-faire intuition and for concern about wild-animal suffering. | : Le présent essai examine la tension entre la préoccupation pour la souffrance des animaux sauvages et celle concernant l’influence massive des humains sur la nature. Il examine l’éthique animale de Clare Palmer, notamment sa tentative d’atteindre un équilibre entre la politique de non-intervention dans la nature dite du « laissez-faire » et nos engagements envers les animaux. L’article propose une approche alternative à celle de Palmer qui, tout en défendant cette intuition du « laissez-faire », se fonde cette fois sur une valeur environnementale significative de plus en plus importante : le Respect pour une Nature Indépendante. Le texte articule et défend la valeur de naturalité et examine les implications de celle-ci pour l’intuition du « laissez-faire » ainsi que pour le souci envers la souffrance des animaux sauvages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:OSCAR WILDE AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM by Guy Willoughby Towards the beginning ofthe hugely entertaining and provocative manifesto called "The Critic as Artist" (1890),1 Oscar Wilde causes the well-named discipulus Ernest to inquire of the suave magister, Gilbert: "But what are the two supreme and highest arts?" The prompt answer takes us to the heart ofWilde's aesthetic priorities: "Life and Literature," says Gilbert: "Life and the perfect expression of (...) life" (p. 1016). The aim of this discussion is, first, to consider the terms of Oscar Wilde's aesthetics; second, to relate them to tendencies in contemporary theory. I will be arguing, in sum, that the ideas entertained in his essays, and demonstrated in his fictions, have suggestive implications for our practices today—particularly in die light of a gathering rapprochement across the range of cultural study. The abiding theme ofOscar Wilde's writings is his insistence throughout not merely on art's primacy, but on the vital importance ofaesthetic criteria to life itself. In de Profundü (1897), that extraordinary attempt at self-definition, the author claims that it is only by conceiving of one's existence as an art-statement, as a dynamic convergence of forces extending in time and place, that trial, humiliation, and reversal—the shocks the flesh is heir to—can be imaginatively subsumed into a composite whole. He summed up the argument of the apologia thus to André Gide: "My life is like a work of art; an artist never starts the 316 Guy Willoughby317 same thing twice... or if he does, it's that he hasn't succeeded. My life before prison was as successful as possible. Now it's something that's over."2 Accordingly, he ascribes in de Profundis the greatest value to the frank acceptance of all one's deeds and susceptibilities, no matter how vicious or unlovely: "to reject one's experiences is to arrest one's development," he writes. "Whatever is realised is right" (p. 916). It is noteworthy, furthermore, that Wilde oudines this same argument under varying conditions throughout his work as essayist, story-teller, and playwright. In his wry but delicately tuned fairy tales, the most successful heroes and heroines are those who—like the litde Nightingale, the young King, or the Star-Child—manage to transform their lives into images of complex, artistic unity, suggestive of the radical power of the imagination. As the author ofde Profundis was to remark: "every work of art is the conversion of an idea into an image. Every single human being should be the fulfilment of a prophecy" (p. 928). Likewise, the elegant rhetorical strategies of Wilde's two critical dialogues announce art's power to starde and provoke its spectators into new attitudes, and—in particular—to suggest a transference ofaesthetic criteria to life itself. Artistic appreciation develops "that sense of form which is the basis of creative no less than of critical achievement," which may then be profitably applied to one's disparate experience: "it is form that creates not merely the critical temperament, but also the aesthetic instinct, that unerring instinct that reveals to one all things under their conditions of beauty" ("The Critic as Artist," p. 1052). It is only by cultivating a flexible, formalist oudook that a cramping and static Weltanschauung may be avoided; ethical distinctions too must be recast, if a successful life-as-artwork is to be sustained. Thus, writes Wilde, "Ethics, like natural selection, makes existence possible. Aesthetics, like sexual selection, makes life lovely and wonderful, fills it with new forms, and gives it progress, variety and change" (p. 1058). Moreover, the critical or aesthetic impulse—and the point of Wilde's essay is that the terms are interchangeable—has overall a vital cosmopolitan function; it will heal all human divisions, "by insisting on the unity of the human mind in the variety of its forms" (p. 1057). If we transfer aesthetic criteria from art to life, therefore, we will discover a new raison d'être in a skeptical age; we will understand that our apprehension of symmetry in art offers a motive for restoring a novel order to our own lives, singly and together. So it will be that "form [will... (shrink)

PreámbuloEl sentimiento contiene una sabiduría que la razón desconoce. Esta intuición es de los filósofos, los poetas, los artistas, los cantores como Violeta en "Volver a los 17". Nació Violeta a quien está dedicado el libro Sabiduría Chamánica del Sentimiento, y con ella los colores que ella y nosotros nos corresponde siempre redescubrir.En la portada de libro de Peter Wild, los colores aparecen distorsionados, quizás acá ya esté el primer indicio de encuentro con esta sabiduría del sentimi..

Wild horses are becoming dependent on transitional environments between domesticity and wildness. In Dutch new nature areas they are learning to perform roles as ecological surrogates for their extinct ancestors. In the U.S. wild horses are 'feral' and exist in numbers deemed to be in excess of the carrying capacity of semi-arid public range lands. The federal government is removing and relocating thousands to long-term holding pastures. The capabilities approach of Nussbaum (2006) allows us to evaluate this transitional environment against (...) a threshold of opportunities to exercise capabilities judged to be central to their flourishing as wild horses. (shrink)

El momento donde los humanos caen en el estado de "bestioni" ("grandes bestias") es pensado claramente por G. B. Vico como el de una segunda caída: una caída en lo anterior a todos los vínculos, ya sea entre aquellos que existen entre los humanos mismos o entre aquellos con la divinidad. El Diritto universale y la Scienza Nuova se dan entonces como tarea el pensar las modalidades (simbólicas, poéticas, políticas…) del porvenir del humano, bajo el fondo de una reactivación de (...) la fuerza de lo verdadero ("vis veri") y de una relación con la divinidad. Así se ve aparecer el espacio familiar, luego el espacio político con sus diversas disposiciones sucesivas, sin que por eso desaparezca la dimensión animal del humano. The moment when humans fall into a state of "bestioni" ("big beasts") is clearly envisioned by G. B. Vico as a second fall: a fall into something previous to all bonding, be it among humans themselves or with the divinity. The Diritto universale and the Scienza Nuova assume then the thinking of new forms (symbolic, poetic, political…) of human's future, under the reactivation of truth as a force ("vis veri") and a relationship with the divinity. Thus emerges the family space, then the politics space with its successive and diverse dispositions, but always keeping the human's animal dimension. (shrink)

OSCAR HORTA | : This paper examines the extent of the opposition between environmentalists and those concerned with wild-animal suffering and considers whether there are any points they may agree on. The paper starts by presenting the reasons to conclude that suffering and premature death prevail over positive well-being in nature. It then explains several ways to intervene in order to aid animals and prevent the harms they suffer, and claims that we should support them. In particular, the paper argues (...) in favour of carrying out more research to learn the best ways to intervene without causing more harm to other animals and to intervene first in areas significantly transformed by human action. It then examines what positions environmentalist views can have towards intervention in nature for the sake of animals. It claims that, while ecocentric and naturocentric views will strongly oppose intervention in certain circumstances, they should not do so in other cases in which the values they promote are not at stake or might be outweighed. The paper then argues that, contrary to what it might seem at first, biocentric views should strongly support intervention. It then discusses whether there may be certain practical issues about which those concerned with wild animal suffering and environmentalists may support the same approach, such as opposition to the greening of desert ecosystems. Finally, it claims that raising awareness about wild animal suffering seems to be the most urgent task now for those concerned about it. | : Le présent article examine l’étendue de l’opposition entre les environnementalistes et ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, afin de déterminer s’il existe des points sur lesquels ils peuvent être en accord. L’article débute en présentant les raisons permettant de conclure que la souffrance et la mort prématurée l’emportent sur le bien-être positif dans la nature. Ensuite, il explique plusieurs façons d’intervenir afin d’aider les animaux et de prévenir les maux dont ils souffrent et plaide pour la mise en oeuvre de celles-ci. Plus précisément, l’article préconise un plus grand nombre de recherches afin de déterminer les meilleures façons d’intervenir sans causer davantage de maux à d’autres animaux ainsi que pour prioriser des interventions en des endroits que l’action humaine a significativement transformés. L’article examine par la suite les positions que les conceptions environnementalistes peuvent adopter quant aux interventions dans la nature pour le bien des animaux. L’article propose que, bien que des visions écocentriques et naturocentriques s’opposent vivement à l’intervention dans certaines circonstances, elles ne devraient cependant pas s’y opposer dans les cas où les valeurs qu’elles promeuvent n’entrent pas en jeu ou peuvent avoir moins de poids que d’autres facteurs. L’article soutient ensuite que, contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait penser à première vue, les théories biocentristes devraient fortement appuyer l’intervention. Il pose la question à savoir si certains problèmes pratiques peuvent faire l’objet d’une approche commune parmi les environnementalistes et ceux qui se soucient de la souffrance des animaux sauvages, par exemple s’opposer à l’écologisation des déserts. Enfin, l’article propose que la tâche la plus pressante pour ceux qui se préoccupent de la souffrance des animaux sauvages consiste à accroître la sensibilisation à ce problème. (shrink)

With the turning of wilderness areas into wildlife parks and the returning of developed areas of land to the forces of nature, intermediate hybrid realms surface in which wild and managed nature become increasingly entangled. A partitioning of environmental philosophy into ecoethics and animal welfare ethics leaves these mixed territories relatively uncharted—the first dealing with wild (animals), the second with the welfare of captive or domestic animals. In this article, we explore an environmental philosophy that considers explicitly these mixed situations. (...) We examine a recent Dutch policy of introducing domesticated and semi-wild large herbivores in newly developed nature areas. Larger issues are at stake, such as the intertwinement of nature and culture, the dynamic character of de-domestication processes, and the relation between concepts of authenticity and the wild. We sketch a pluralistic, dynamic, and pragmatic environmental philosophy that is capable of dealing with the complicated ethicalproblems concerning creatures and land caught between domestication and the wild. (shrink)

This paper proposes different approaches to design, referring to gambiarra practices and artifacts and their relation to complexity theory, evoking critical theorists that take undecidability into account in order to link gambiarra to operations that breed complexity and responsibility. The word gambiarra comes from Brazilian slang and describes an intervention or artifact meant to provide a provisory solution to an unexpected event or crisis. This kind of alternative design differs radically from conventional design because it does not come from formally (...) trained, engineer-minded, projects. Instead, it lacks control, stability and durability. As it offers no permanent solution, it opens room for further accidents and is messy, especially if compared to a conservative model for creation that praises human predominance, soundness and efficiency. Therefore, gambiarra often has negative connotations that this analysis aims to challenge, by relating it to principles of complexity theory. Complexity theory is a transdisciplinary field for research aimed at the organization of living systems, with a vast understanding of networks and what life and govern are. It gathers insights from different disciplines to explore the interconnectivity between individuals, their systems and environment. It unveils how ambivalent information/noise relationships are fundamental for the increase of diversity in a system. It also displays the intelligent dynamics resulting from seemingly insignificant neighborhood relations that collectively make it possible to adapt and continuously change structures. With that in mind, the “deficient” aspect of gambiarra becomes more valuable, as it hints at a potential to generate new information and structures beyond entropic models that perpetuate the same logics across time. Michel Serres’s information theory presented in the book The Parasite is brought up in comparison to gambiarra, in order to explore the potential of interdependent ambiguous relationships that may not fit in dominant forms of discourse. Concomitantly, Vilém Flusser’s notion of responsibility reinforces the argument that a fabric of dynamic differences can emerge out of mutual engagement and indeterminacy. Underlying, this paper concerns with drafting ecological discourses and practices that can embrace contradictions and the plurality of worlds, noticing complex phenomena that have been pushed to the margins, while also decentralizing from hegemonic models. It questions the predominance of the prevailing design paradigm in the search for non-eurocentric and non-anthropocentric human-environment relationships and forms of provision of human needs. (shrink)

Near the end of W. G. Sebald’s Austerlitz, the book’s eponymous protagonist recalls visiting the zoo of the Jardin des Plantes with his friend Marie.1 The zoo is in bad shape; the pair overhear children questioning their parents: “Mais il est où? Pourquoi il se cache? Pourquoi il ne bouge pas? Est-ce qu’il est mort?” Sebald writes:I recollect that I myself saw a family of fallow deer gathered together by a manger of hay near the perimeter fence of a dusty (...) enclosure where no grass grew, a living picture of mutual trust and harmony which also had about it an air of constant vigilance and alarm. Marie particularly asked me to take a photograph of this beautiful group, and as she did so, said Austerlitz, she said... (shrink)

Dans un contexte marqué par la révolution industrielle, et donc la mécanisation du travail, Oscar Wilde porte un regard critique sur les possibilités nouvelles accordées à la mise en scène de théâtre. Loin d’être accessoire, la scénographie est constitutive d’une œuvre irréductible au texte et fait, du théâtre, le lieu d’un art total où le décorateur est artiste et les métiers collaborent.

En partant de l’étonnement qu’a suscité l’apparition d’animaux sauvages dans les villes désertées par leurs habitants confinés, cet article met en exergue ce que la vie sauvage nous apprend de la vie urbaine, de ses insuffisances, de ses aberrations, des sacrifices qu’elle impose et des contraintes qu’elle exerce sur les vivants en général. Comment faire de la ville une nouvelle arche de Noé? Telle est la question qui se pose.

In a promising working note to the Visible and Invisible, Merleau-Ponty proposes that we understand Being according to topological space – relations of proximity, distance, and envelopment – and move away from an image of Being based on homogeneous, inert Euclidean space. With reference to treatments of cross-sensory perception, color-blindness, and the concept of quale or qualia, I seek to rehearse this shift from Euclidean to topological Being by illustrating how modern science confines color itself to a Euclidean model of (...) color space. I discuss “being as Object” in Merleau-Ponty’s later work before showing how color, and indeed all perception, is reduced to being as Object in the form of “quale”. Next, I address discussions in Merleau-Ponty’s work and contemporary research to illustrate how synesthesia and so-called color-blindness are rendered abnormal by this objectified being of color. Merleau-Ponty’s reading of synesthesia follows directly from his rejection of quale, and his use of color perception serves as a rejection of solipsism. With appeal to his proposed topological model of Being, I conclude by recognizing the problematic nature of synesthesia and color-blindness as being ontological, not psychological.Dans une note de travail, à mon sens décisive, du Visible et l’Invisible, Merleau-Ponty propose que l’on comprenne l’Être à partir de l’espace topologique – relations de proximité, distance et enveloppement – allant à l’encontre d’une l’image de l’Être fondée sur un espace euclidien homogène et inerte. En faisant référence aux traitements de la perception synesthésique, au daltonisme et au concept de quale ou qualia, j’essayerai de décrire ce passage de l’Être euclidien à l’Être topologique en montrant que la science moderne finit par confiner la couleur dans un modèle euclidien d’espace-couleur. J’examinerai « l’Être-objet » dans les derniers écrits de Merleau-Ponty avant de montrer comment la couleur, et plus en général la perception, est réduite à être comme un Objet dans la forme d’un « quale ». Ensuite, en examinant les analyses merleau-pontiennes et les recherches contemporaines, je montrerai comment la synesthésie et le daltonisme sont donc considérés comme anormaux à partir de cette objectivation de la couleur. La lecture que Merleau-Ponty donne de la synesthésie est la conséquence directe de son refus du quale, et l’utilisation qu’il fait de la perception des couleurs sert comme un refus du solipsisme. En faisant appel au modèle topologique de l’Être qu’il propose, je conclurai en constatant que la nature problématique de la synesthésie et du daltonisme est ontologique et non pas psychologique.In una nota di lavoro al Visibile e l’invisibile, Merleau-Ponty propone di comprendere l’Essere a partire da uno spazio topologico – secondo le relazioni di prossimità, distanza e avvolgimento – e abbandona l’immagine di un Essere fondato su uno spazio omogeneo, inerte, euclideo. Facendo riferimento ai trattamenti per le percezioni sinestetiche, al daltonismo e al concetto di quale o qualia, si cercherà di provare questo passaggio da un Essere euclideo a uno topologico, illustrando quanto la scienza moderna tenda a ridurre il concetto stesso di colore a un modello euclideo di spazio-colore. Si esaminerà l’“Essere-oggetto” degli ultimi lavori di Merleau-Ponty, mostrando come il colore, e in realtà la percezione tout court, vengano ridotti a oggetto nella forma di “quale”. Infine, si esaminerà l’opera merleau-pontiana e la ricerca contemporanea al fine di illustrare quanto la sinestesia e il daltonismo siano resi anormali da questa oggettivazione dell’essere del colore. L’interpretazione merleau-pontiana della sinestesia deriva proprio dal suo rifiuto del quale, e il suo uso della percezione del colore funge da rifiuto del solipsismo. Ricorrendo al modello topologico di Essere elaborato da Merleau-Ponty, si conclude riconoscendo che il problema della sinestesia e del daltonismo è, a tutti gli effetti, ontologico e non psicologico. (shrink)

Definition of the problem In medicine, as well as in other disciplines, computer science expertise is becoming increasingly important. This requires a culture of interdisciplinary assessment, for which medical ethics committees are not well prepared. The use of big data and artificial intelligence (AI) methods (whether developed in-house or in the form of “tools”) pose further challenges for research ethics reviews. Arguments This paper describes the problems and suggests solving them through procedural changes. Conclusion An assessment that is interdisciplinary from (...) the outset appears to be more suitable than having two commissions with different expertise. However, this would require that the composition of medical ethics committees be altered. In addition, the article recommends initial measures to be taken during research ethics reviews of big data and AI projects in order to consolidate the review process and ensure standardization of the criteria. (shrink)